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*Cov. L.J. 79  Introduction 
Although the English legal system, like many others, makes a distinction between private 
and public law principles and doctrines,1 there are many occasions when private law 
principles are extended into public law contexts and public law principles into private law. 
The extension of these principles into their opposite fields is not without controversy. The 
reason for this relates simply to the fact that the functions of private and public law are 
different: whereas private law governs the relationship between individuals, public law is 
concerned with the relationship between individuals at large and the State and its various 
organs, and as such the decisions of public law decisions affect the public at large and not 
just the parties involved.2 An illustration of the uncomfortable application of a private law 
concept in a purely public law context is provided by the recent House of Lords case R v. 
East Sussex County Council, ex p Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd; Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd v. 
East Sussex County Council.3 In this case the House of Lords had to consider the extent to 
which the private law concept of estoppel was applicable to planning law, in particular, the 
extent to which informal advice given by a local official, that planning permission was not 
necessary for the use of land, should be regarded as a binding decision by the local 
authority which was purporting to act under its statutory powers. 
The Facts 
The case involved an appeal by East Sussex County Council from a decision given by the 
Court of Appeal,4 which refused the Council's appeal from an order made by Tucker J5 
where he allowed the respondents, Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd, to seek judicial review of the 
County Council's decision that no planning permission was required for the generation of 
electricity at a waste plant. The waste plant was *Cov. L.J. 80  initially built by East 
Sussex County Council and was vested in a company created by the Council, East Sussex 
Enterprises Ltd (ESEL). Sometime in 1990 ESEL decided to sell the plant. A number of 
purchaser were interested in the waste plant, particularly so because the plant had 
potential to generate electricity with the waste. One question was whether planning 
permission would be required for the use of the plant for generating electricity, as this 
would constitute a change of use of the land. A solicitor for one of the prospective buyers 
consulted Mr. Roy Vandermeer QC who advised them that it would not amount to a 
material change of use. This advice was reaffirmed by the county planning officer, although 
no formal application to the county council to determine the matter was made under s.64 
of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.6 
A further issue on the facts related to condition 10 of ESEL's original planning permission, 
which prevented the use of power driven machinery before 6.00am and after 10.00pm and 
imposed a total ban on work at the plant on Sundays and Bank holidays. Prospective 
purchasers argued that this would not be possible if the waste plant was to be used for the 
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purposes of generating electricity 24 hours a day and for 7 days a week. An application was 
made to alter condition 10 under s.73 of the 1990 Act. The matter was dealt with by 
Development Control Sub-Committee who had to consider two questions; firstly, whether 
the process of generating power from waste material required planning permission, 
secondly, whether noise emissions from the machinery would have adverse affects on local 
residents. The Committee was assisted by the planning officer who recommended planning 
permission be granted and that there was no material change of use of the waste plant. 
Furthermore, he stated that noise levels be controlled at night through a noise attenuation 
scheme. 
No further action was taken by ELES and Reprotech Pebsham Ltd eventually purchased the 
waste plant. The County Council withdrew the application to amend condition 10 by ELES 
since no further development on the electricity generation issue remained as far as they 
were concerned. Very little happened over the next five or six years and Reprotech 
eventually decided to use the waste plant for generating electricity and decided to apply for 
planning permission under the 1990 Act. When they established that the local residents 
objected to this use of the waste plant, they proceeded to rely on the representation of the 
planning officer made in 1991 that, inter alia , no planning permission was required and 
this was a determination under s.64 of the 1990 Act. Furthermore, they argued that the 
determination by the Development Control Sub Committee constituted a determination 
under s.64 of the 1990 Act. 
The Decision of the House of Lords 
The House of Lords rejected the argument that the decision of the Development Control 
Sub-Committee of 1991 constituted a determination under s.64 so that no planning 
permission was required for the generation of electricity. In doing so, the House of Lords 
attempted to put an end to the application of the estoppel doctrine in planning cases. Lord 
Hoffmann giving the leading opinion, firstly attempted to explain the nature of a planning 
determination under the 1990 Act. His Lordship explained that a determination for planning 
permission under ss.191 and 192 of the 1990 Act was not a matter simply between the 
applicant and the planning authority in *Cov. L.J. 81  which they are free to agree on 
whatever procedure they agree. In his Lordship's words ‘…it is a also a matter which 
concerns the general public interest and which requires other planning authorities, the 
Secretary of State on behalf of the national interest and the public itself to participate.’7 A 
determination under ss.191 and 192 of the 1990 Act is made in response to an application 
that provides the planning authority with the details relating to the existing use of the land 
and how the applicant intends to use that land. The application is entered onto a public 
register, which is intended to give the public an opportunity to make representations to the 
planning authority. The district authority is then allowed to make its own representations. 
The Secretary of State is given the opportunity to consider the application in his own 
capacity. Seen in this way, a determination under the 1990 Act is more than just a matter 
between a private individual and the planning authority. In this respect, Lord Hoffmann 
commented that it would be unhelpful to introduce the private law concept of estoppel into 
planning law. His Lordship referred to the words of Lord Scarman, who in an earlier case 
commented that ‘…estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would be 
unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these 
concepts of private law should not be extended into the public law of planning control, 
which binds everyone.’8 
Lord Mackay was also at pains to dismiss the role of estoppel in planning law; in particular 
that public law was required to stand on its own feet without interference from private law 
concepts. His Lordship commented that ‘…where public authorities are fulfilling statutory 
duties or exercising statutory discretions, the public interest in their activities and the 
effect on members of the public who are not parties to the particular process which the 
authority is conducting requires the law to differentiate clearly between such activities and 
those in which interests only of those directly must be considered.’9 
Estoppel and Public/Planning Law 
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Until the decision in the present case there had already been concerns over the proper role 
of the estoppel principle in public law. Its intervention in the public law context seems to 
have taken place at a time when the public law principles of abuse of power and legitimate 
expectations were relatively underdeveloped. In that context estoppel provided a means 
by which individuals could prevent public authorities going back on representations made 
by their officials. In an early case concerning a decision given by the Minister of Pensions to 
a serving army officer that his disability was attributable to military service, which the 
Minister then later decided it was not, Denning J explained the role of estoppel in such 
cases thus:10 ‘…if a government department in its dealings with a subject takes it upon 
itself to assume authority upon a matter with which he is concerned, he is entitled to rely 
upon it having the authority which it assumes. He does not know and cannot be expected 
to know, the limits of its authority.’11 This principle was, however, rejected by the House 
of Lords in Howell *Cov. L.J. 82  v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co,12 which concerned a 
decision given by a licensing officer that work could be carried out on certain vessels even 
though a written licence was needed to do so. Thus, it has been accepted that the estoppel 
principle was primarily rejected because it allowed ‘officials to play fast and loose with legal 
rules, whether relating to criminal law or to the limits of a public authority's powers, duties 
or jurisdiction.’13 
Although the general application of estoppel in public law had been clearly rejected, it did 
have some role to play in the context of planning law. In this context, informal assurances 
given by planning officers were, it was argued, binding when individuals had relied on 
them. The clearest example of this was Lever Finance Ltd v. Westminster Council,14 where 
the Court of Appeal held that a decision by the planning officer that no further planning 
permission was necessary for minor alteration to developmental work was binding on the 
Council. However, even in the context of planning law, the courts began to take a very 
cautious approach to the application of estoppel in planning matters. Thus, in Western Fish 
Products Ltd v. Penwith District Council15 the Court of Appeal had to consider whether 
written communication between a planning officer and the plaintiff to the effect that the 
latter had existing use rights in respect of property and that planning permission would be 
granted, was binding on the council. In this case, the plaintiff's argument was based on 
proprietary estoppel, which unlike promissory estoppel acts as a sword as well as a 
shield.16 The plaintiff's argument was that because they had been led to believe that they 
had rights of use over the property and that they were told that no planning permission was 
required, they not only expected the rights of use in the land but also that no planning 
permission was necessary. The Court of Appeal rejected this line of argument. In the first 
place, there could be no grounds for invoking proprietary estoppel because the plaintiff's 
had not suffered any detriment simply because they had not incurred any expenditure on 
the land.17 Secondly, it was only the Council who could determine whether planning 
permission was necessary, and while it could delegate its power to the planning officer, 
there had to be something over and above the officer's position which justified the 
applicant in believing that the officer would bind the Council. The effect of this decision was 
that statements by planning officers would only bind the council if they related to 
procedural matters or where the claimant could prove that the planning officer had specific 
delegated authority from the planning committee to make such decision. 
Conclusion 
It is submitted that the decision in East Sussex has firmly put an end to the role of estoppel 
in planning cases where developers attempt to rely on representations made by planning 
officers and authorities to the effect that no planning permission will be required for 
developmental or other work. Thus, it seems unlikely that in the future *Cov. L.J. 
83  there will be a ‘back door’ entry available to developers who attempt to rely on such 
representations without recourse to the proper statutory procedures required for proper 
planning permission. The decision is to be welcomed for a number of reasons. In the first 
place, the decision introduces an element of certainty by ensuring that correct procedures 
are followed, which otherwise would not be if estoppel allowed those very procedures to be 
bypassed. Secondly, as Lord Hoffmann explained, estoppel, which is essentially a private 
law concept, is not an appropriate concept in public/planning law. In such a context the 
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courts are required not only to balance the interests of private individuals and public 
authorities but the interests of the public at large as well. The estoppel principle fails to 
take into account the requirement of a public authority to consider the interests of the 
public at large, which after all it is expected to promote. 
Although estoppel will not operate in the same fashion in planning cases like East Sussex, 
there still remains the question of how the law can deal with those situations where an 
applicant or developer feels there has been some unfairness in the way that a planning 
officer or other official person has acted in an informal procedure. It appears that the 
matter will now have to be resolved by reference to legitimate expectations rather than 
estoppel. Under the doctrine of legitimate expectations, individuals may argue that it is 
unfair and an abuse of power for official to go back on promises and representations that 
have been made to them. Thus, it is now possible, in appropriate cases, for an individual to 
receive a substantive (as opposed to a purely procedural) benefit as a result of a promise 
or previous practice of a public authority, which it would be unfair of the authority to go 
back on.18 However, that doctrine is restricted by the rule that allows the authority to 
break the promise where it would be clearly in the public interest to do so.19 In addition, 
the doctrine cannot be used to bestow on an authority a power that it does not have in the 
first place.20 Thus, although the concepts of estoppel and legitimate expectations are 
similar in nature, their scope and application are rather different. Consequently, Lord 
Hoffmann noted that the estoppel and legitimate expectations is ‘no more than an analogy 
because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of 
the general public…’21 This means that in the planning cases considered in this note, the 
public interest may override the unfairness caused to the individual who relies on 
representations made by planning officers. 
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